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Abstract: When do we meet the standard of proof in a criminal trial? Some have argued that it is 
when the guilt of the defendant is sufficiently probable on the evidence. Some have argued that it 
is a matter of normic support. While the first view provides us with a nice account of how we 
ought to manage risk, the second explains why we shouldn’t convict on the basis of naked 
statistical evidence alone. Unfortunately, this second view doesn’t help us understand how we 
should manage risk (e.g., the risk of violating rights against wrongful conviction) and faces 
counterexamples of its own. I shall defend an alternative approach that builds on the strengths of 
these two accounts. On the approach defending here, it is objectively suitable to punish iff we 
know a defendant to be guilty. To determine what is consistent with procedural justice and to 
determine what we prospectively ought to do, we need to think about the risks we face of deviating 
from this objective ideal.   
 
Forthcoming in J. Robson and Z. Hoskins (ed.), Truth and Trial. Routledge. 
 
0. Introduction 
Let’s begin with Smith’s (2018) question. When, he asks, does evidence suffice for conviction? An 
increasingly popular answer is that it does so when it makes it sufficiently probable that the 
defendant is guilty (Probable Guilt).1 Smith’s answer is that it does so when it provides normic 
support for this belief (Normal Guilt).2 Cases of naked statistical evidence best lay bare the 
difference between these approaches, so we shall discuss these cases. Smith is right to reject 
Probable Guilt, but I fear that Normal Guilt is subject to counterexamples of its own. I shall 
present one in §2 and introduce my alternative to these accounts in §3. 
An important part of the disagreement between Smith and the defenders of Probable Guilt 
is a disagreement about how to rightly handle risk. Smith’s account of epistemic justification is 
pitched as an alternative to the familiar ‘risk minimisation’ picture of justification according to 
which beliefs are justified when the risk of error isn’t too great. Because Smith’s account of the 
standard of proof preserves a connection between meeting the standard of proof and having 
beliefs that are, according to his theory, justified, Normal Guilt commits us some claims about the 
connection between just conviction and risk that I think are problematic. While I think that he 
gets the cases of naked statistical right, I fear that the resultant view he offers to explain these 
verdicts clashes with our best approach to how we ought to manage risk. My view is designed to 
preserve the connection between the justification of belief and just conviction and I believe that it 
fits better with our best views about how we ought to deal with risky situations given our views 
about the rights of defendants.    
Before we turn to the discussion of naked statistical evidence, let me say something about 
the disagreements at issue. Like Smith, I think that our theories of justification should inform our 
account of the standard of proof. And I shall assume that the guilty verdict results in a just 
conviction iff the standard of proof is met. It should be noted that when Smith asks about the 
sufficiency of evidence, however, he’s asking a practical question, not (merely) an epistemic one. The 
question presupposes that there’s a kind of evidential support that determines whether a 
conviction is just or not. It just so happens that his theory of when evidence suffices for this 
practical purpose, it is the evidence that determines whether our beliefs are justified. For reasons 
																																																						
1 For defences of this approach, see Hedden and Colyvan (2019), Krauss (forthcoming), Lempert 
(1977), Papineau (forthcoming), Ross (forthcoming), and Steele (MS).  
2 A body of evidence E provides normic support for p iff the E-worlds in which p is true are more 
normal than any E-worlds in which ~p. 
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that I shall discuss below, I have some deep reservations about the presuppositions of Smith’s 
question, but I do think that he’s right that our theory of the standard of proof should 
accommodate this idea:  
Weak Justification: We should not convict unless the jury has 
justification to believe that the defendant is guilty.3 
This gives us a useful way to test proposals about the standard of proof. If a theory says that we 
ought to convict without justification or we ought to convict without what the theory says is 
required for justification, we have a good reason to reject that theory. As I see it, the best arguments 
for Probable Guilt don’t support the idea that we ought not convict without justification and the 
counterexamples to Normal Guilt show that we ought to convict without justification as that 




    
1. Probable Guilt 
Let me briefly explain why Probable Guilt might seem plausible and why this appearance is 
misleading. The jury has to make a decision under uncertainty and we might frame their decision 
problem like this:       
  
The Veritist’s Decision-Matrix 
 Guilty (g) Not Guilty (~g) 
Convict good very bad 
Don’t Convict bad neutral 
 
Since we should (in some sense) maximise expected choiceworthiness, we can see why we 
shouldn’t convict unless it’s highly probable that the defendant is guilty. By the same logic, we 
should convict when the probability is sufficiently high. Those who shoulder the unhappy burden 
of having to decide whether to convict can take some small comfort in the fact that we can offer 
them simple rules, simple matrices, and simple sets of choices so that they can be confident that 
they made the right choice if they choose to convict in a case like this:  
Prisoners  
The defendant is one of the 100 prisoners who were exercising 
in the yard. On that afternoon, 99 of the prisoners suddenly 
put into action a plan to attack a guard. In addition to the 99 
assailants, there was one more prisoner who was in the yard. 
He knew nothing of the plan or the attack as it took place. 
(Even complicated attacks involving lots of assailants might be 
difficult for bystanders to notice.) You have no further 
information available to help you determine whether the 
defendant took part in the attack and you have to decide 
whether to convict the defendant on the basis of the 
information that’s been provided (Redmayne (2008)). 
The problem with this verdict, Thomson says, is that we should only convict if, “we can be very 
sure of having a guarantee” (1986: 215). We don’t have that in this case.  This fits with my 
intuitions, but what about the decision-theoretic rationale for Probable Guilt? Why should we care 
about anything but the probabilities?  
Here’s why. These were our assumptions when we framed the decision-problem:  
A1. The outcome <convict, guilty> is good. 
																																																						
3 See Littlejohn (2012, forthcoming). 
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A2. The outcome <convict, not guilty> is the worst outcome. 
A3. The outcome <don’t convict, guilty> is bad. 
A4. The outcome <don’t convict, not guilty> is neutral.4  
Consider (A3). Why should we assume that this outcome uniformly has negative valence? 
According to (A3), the practice should see the relevant outcome (i.e., <don’t convict, guilty>) as 
bad however it is brought about. This seems wrong. A jury might convict on the basis of evidence 
that would lead most reasonable people to conclude that the defendant is innocent. We might 
think that (in a sense) this is bad regardless of whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. Once 
we see this and we see that neither <convict, guilty> nor <don’t convict, guilty> have uniform 
valence, we can see why someone might be sceptical of the decision-theoretic rationale offered in 
support of Probable Guilt.  
  
 Let’s connect this to Thomson’s point about the guarantee. The criminal trial should be 
subject to a kind of norm, one that regulates the practice so that the jury’s guilty finding can be 
seen as fit for its function. Like Duff, I think the guilty verdict can only fulfil this function when 
it can serve as, ‘an institutional analogue of a moral accusation’ (1986: 116). It is constitutive of 
reaching a good or neutral outcome by means of a guilty verdict that we meet the normative 
conditions necessary for blaming them for wrongdoing. And this requires that we don’t blame or 
deliver the guilty verdict unless the right epistemic condition is met. The source of this requirement 
is not itself epistemic, but it imposes epistemic standards nonetheless.5 This, I submit, requires that 
the jury can believe with justification that the defendant has acted badly.6 But this requires that 
they meet the condition imposed by Weak Justification. In brief, this is my objection to the 
decision-theoretic argument for Probable Guilt. A crucial assumption in the argument for 
Probable Guilt was that we could first assign value to the outcomes that figured in the veritist’s 
decision-matrix without taking account of the epistemic position of the jury. But we cannot. This 
is because we cannot say whether the outcome was good unless we know if the jury met the 
epistemic conditions necessary for holding the defendant to account.  
 
2. Normic Support 
Normal Guilt was designed to explain why cases like Prisoners differ from cases in which we have, 
say, experiential grounds for believing someone to be guilty. The rough idea is this. Were it to look 
as if the defendant was committing a crime and were that appearance to be misleading, we would 
find ourselves in an abnormal situation, one that called out for explanation. We would have normic 
support for believing the defendant to be guilty. If, however, we were to form a false belief in a 
case in which our belief is based on naked statistical evidence, this wouldn’t be any indication that 
the situation was abnormal. Since no explanation of the error would be called for, we lack normic 
support and lack justification. So, given Weak Justification, we shouldn’t convict.    
   While Normal Guilt issues the right verdict in Prisoners, it delivers the wrong verdict in 
this case:  
Preface Prisoners 
																																																						
4 Mind you, there are the messy and neglected questions about the prior probabilities we ought to 
have concerning the guilt of the defendant that need attention. See King (MS).   
5 I hope this responds to some of Backe’s (forthcoming) concerns about trying to appeal to 
epistemic considerations to solve legal puzzles. My view isn’t that the epistemic considerations 
taken in isolation from further normative considerations settle the issue. My view is that the further 
normative considerations give us reasons that really matter for meeting epistemic standards. It also 
is intended to address the concerns about epistemic fetishes raised by Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre 
(2012) and Papineau (forthcoming). It’s not fetishistic to care about whether we have standing to 
blame in this process if the finding of guilt is Duff’s institutional analogue of a moral accusation.  
6 For defence, see Adler (2002) and Buchak (2004). 
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The defendant is one of the 100 prisoners who were exercising 
in the yard. On that afternoon, a mob of prisoners suddenly 
put into action a plan to attack a guard. In this trial, as with the 
99 other trials, the prosecution uses the ‘right’ kind of evidence 
to secure a conviction (e.g., multiple eyewitnesses, CCTV 
footage, taped confessions, etc.). Once the trial is over and 
each prisoner is convicted and sentenced, we learn from an 
informant that precisely one of the prisoners in the yard had 
been framed, but the informant isn’t able to identify the 
innocent person before he disappears. 
There’s no possible world in which each proposition in an inconsistent set is true, so there is no 
normal world in which each is true. So, we cannot have normic support for believing the members 
of such a set. Provided that we have justification to believe that we are mistaken in one of these 
cases, Normal Guilt says that we would lack justification to believe some or all of the defendants 
are guilty. Normal Guilt implies that we either lack justification to believe in each case that the 
defendant is guilty or that we have it in some but not others. It would be ‘too externalist’ to say 
that only some of these beliefs are justified when there is no discernible difference in the kind of 
evidence we have in each of the cases and that it would be ‘too sceptical’ to say that we would lack 
justification to believe in each of the cases once we had justification to believe that an error was 
made (Dutant and Littlejohn forthcoming b). It would be too dogmatic to deny or suspend 
judgment on whether an error is made since the informant might bring friends, might be an 
obvious epistemic superior, etc. Given Weak Justification, we now face the worry that Normal 
Guilt says (in effect) that all the prisoners must be freed.7   
 To see why this is a counterexample to Normal Guilt, it’s helpful to think about how much 
we can know prior to receiving the informant’s testimony and after receiving it. Suppose that we 
judge initially (i.e., before we hear from the informant) using the ‘right kind of evidence’ (e.g., 
CCTV footage, a taped confession, eyewitness accounts) that the defendant is guilty and suppose 
that she is guilty. In this case, we can know the defendant to be guilty. And what goes for this case, 
goes for each of the cases in which the belief about the defendant’s guilt can be based on this same 
kind of evidence. (Obviously, we cannot know in the one case where the defendant is innocent.) 
How much of this knowledge could we retain once we hear from the informant? Well, we cannot 
retain knowledge in the one case in which we were mistaken in our belief, but I would think that 
nothing that the informant reveals shows that there is any interesting threat to the knowledge-
status of any particular belief. The relevant belief, for example, could be safe or sensitive. If, in 
keeping with the judgment that the belief was knowledge, we were to say that it wasn’t a matter of 
luck that we got it right initially, it wouldn’t be right to say that it’s now a matter of luck that, say, 
we came to correctly believe that the defendant was guilty given the evidence that we had in the 
trial. If we set up the case the right way, I think it’s possible that we know initially in each case 
involving a guilty person that the person is guilty and that we can retain this knowledge even after 
the informant testifies. 
What does this tell us about rational belief? Given how much knowledge we have and how 
probable it is that we have this knowledge in each case, I would think we have rational belief in 
the cases where we have knowledge and it’s so overwhelmingly likely that we have this knowledge. 
It meets the epistemic condition necessary for properly holding someone responsible. And this is 
																																																						
7 Defenders of Normal Guilt might say that they aren’t offering a theory of when we can justly 
keep people locked away, but we can imagine variants of this case in which this kind of informant 
reveals something about a series of verdicts that are about to be decided.  
 5 
why Normal Guilt is mistaken. We don’t need normic support to know and we know that we can 
be highly confident that we have knowledge even when we’re certain that it is missing.8  
It’s a selling point of Smith’s (2016: 20) view of justification that it predicts that we can 
have pairs of beliefs where one belief is justified, the second isn’t, but the second is more probable. 
This is why he thinks that it’s possible for testimony or perceptual experience to justify a belief 
even if statistical evidence isn’t. He rejects the risk-minimisation picture of justification. I fear that 
without finding some room in our theory of how to manage risk, we’ll run into trouble.  
Consider Prison A and B. No naked statistical evidence was used in convicting any of the 
prisoners. Each prisoner was convicted in accordance with the standards imposed by Normal 
Guilt. Even if the prisons contain the same number of prisoners, this set up doesn’t tell us which 
of these has a higher evidential probability if we combine all the evidence together:  
a. Each prisoner currently held in Prison A is guilty. 
b. Each prisoner currently held in Prison B is guilty. 
Suppose, as seems possibly in Smith’s framework, that the following conditions hold. The wardens 
of the two prisons only have evidence pertaining to the prisoners in their prisons. The wardens 
distribute their credences equally when it comes to propositions about the guilt of the prisoners 
in their prisons and how likely it is that they know these prisoners to be guilty, but while the 
warden of Prison A rationally assigns very high degrees of confidence to these propositions (i.e., 
.97 and .95 respectively), the warden of Prison B rationally assigns lower degrees of confidence to 
the relevant counterpart propositions (i.e., .9 and .86). If they were told by an infallible informant 
that one prisoner in their prison is guilty, their posterior credences in these propositions would 
still be uniform.   
Suppose that while the warden of Prison B gets no new information, a perfectly reliable 
informant tells the warden from Prison A that precisely one prisoner in Prison A is innocent. 
Upon learning this, it seems that he ought to increase his confidence in the guilt of each prisoner 
and his confidence for each prisoner that he knows that prisoner to be guilty. This information 
seems epistemically beneficial. Normal Guilt, however, implies that while the warden of Prison B 
can continue believing each prisoner in her prison is guilty, the warden of Prison A has to suspend 
judgment when it comes to the guilt of each prisoner. 
This is counterintuitive. We need to introduce something to manage risk. Suppose that 
our evidence just consists of the evidence that these two wardens have and that our credences 
about guilt, what we can know, etc. match theirs. Consider:  
Prisoner Transfer  
Prisons A and B catch fire. We have three options: (i) free all 
the prisoners, (ii) move the Prisoners from A to Prison C and 
free the prisoners in B, or (iii) move the Prisoners from B to C 
and free the Prisoners in A.  
We know that Prison A contains one innocent prisoner. We’re nearly certain but don’t know that 
B contains many more innocent prisoners. We have to decide which prisoners to continue to 
punish and which ones to set free. In this case, we should opt for (ii). We cannot reach this verdict 
if we accept Normal Guilt. According to Normal Guilt, we are like the warden of Prison A in that 
our knowledge of the existence of the innocent prisoner in A ensures that we lack justification to 
believe of any prisoner in A that this prisoner is guilty. Thus, given Weak Justification, we could 
not be in favour of continued punishment. We can, according to Normal Guilt, continue to 
justifiably believe of each prisoner in B that they are guilty even though we’re much more certain 
that there are many more innocent prisoners in B than the one innocent prisoner in A. While I 
																																																						
8 For an introduction to the preface, see Makinson (1965). For similar views about rational belief 
in preface cases that don’t just assume the Lockean View, see Dutant and Fitelson (MS), Dutant 
and Littlejohn (forthcoming), Littlejohn (forthcoming b), and Worsnip (2016). For dissenting 
views, see Adler (2002) and Ryan (1991, 1996).   
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would agree that if we lacked justification to believe that a prisoner was guilty, that would give us 
a decisive reason to free them, we don’t have decisive reason to free all the prisoners or to free all 
the prisoners from Prison A.  
 What can we take from this? The right verdict about Prison Transfer seems to tell us two 
things. Assuming Weak Justification, we learn from this case that (a) we ought (in some sense) to 
punish individuals even if in doing so we know that we’ll punish one innocent person and (b) we 
should sometimes see that we have more reason to respond to expected objective wrongfulness 
than known objective wrongfulness. Given these assumptions, we can construct an argument 
against Normal Guilt and use them to help find a plausible alternative.9       
 
3. Knowledge and the Standard of Proof 
Let’s consider a view that explains the differences between cases in which we have experiential 
grounds for our beliefs, Prisoners, and Preface Prisoners:  
Known Guilt: A jury ought to convict the defendant iff the 
jury knows the defendant to be guilty.10  
In Prisoners, we cannot know that any of the guilty prisoners are guilty, but we can know that 
many of them are in Preface Prisoners. Known Guilt tells us that the latter is normatively similar 
to the humdrum cases where we have fallible experiential grounds for our beliefs and that the 
former is not because of the difference in the prospect for acquiring knowledge in these cases.   
While I have considerable sympathy for this view, it faces objections. I’ll discuss two. First, 
some object to its handling of Preface Prisoners on the grounds that it’s thought to be implausible 
that we ought to treat the individuals differently by convicting some but not others. Second, some 
object to Known Guilt because it introduces a factive standard.  
Let’s start with the concern about factivity: 
… beyond reasonable doubt is less demanding than knowledge 
… [P]lausibly a compelling case for a person’s guilt can satisfy 
the legal threshold of beyond reasonable doubt even if the 
person is innocent. Some false convictions are procedurally 
correct (Gardiner forthcoming: 8).11 
																																																						
9 See Zimmerman (2009) for an argument that the right that a person has against others is limited 
to the right that they not be subject to certain kinds of risks by the other where the risks that matter 
here are determined by the agent’s evidence. With apologies to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., this 
view says that your rights begin roughly around where the noses of others begin. In Littlejohn 
(2012), I argue that this view implies implausible things about rights of self-defence and the duty 
of reparation. It cannot explain why, for example, we have reparative duties to those who we 
discover later were wrongfully convicted for crimes they didn’t commit. Zimmerman agrees on 
the implications of his view for reparations, but doesn’t agree that this is a decisive objection. It’s 
unclear whether Smith (forthcoming) thinks that the prisoner’s rights supervene upon the jury’s 
evidence or whether he really believes in the right against wrongful conviction.   
10 For defence of views on which there is an anti-luck condition on the standard of proof that is 
at least similar to the one needed for knowledge, see Duff (1986), Littlejohn (forthcoming), Moss 
(2018), and Thomson (1986).     
11 Like Duff (1986: 110), I think that the criminal trial is an example of imperfect procedural justice. 
We can specify what the just outcome would have to be without just describing the just procedures 
that lead to the trial’s conclusion. And I think that our practice of reparation reveals that part of a 
just conviction is that the rights of the defendant, which include a right against wrongful 
conviction, have not been violated. Neither Gardiner nor Smith seem to accept my argument 
(2012: 142) for a factive standard on the grounds that only it would ensure that the right against 
wrongful conviction is not violated by a (putatively) just conviction, so I worry that they might 
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Part of me wants to challenge this on grounds that the standard for determining whether a 
conviction is just is factive, but I don’t want to rehash this debate because I don’t know why 
Gardiner or Smith don’t accept my earlier arguments for a factive standard.12 Instead, I shall offer 
an account that gives Gardiner and Smith at least part of what they want, something that fits with 
Gardiner’s focus on procedural justice. 
 Gardiner is right that Known Guilt doesn’t give us a plausible account of procedural justice. 
This doesn’t trouble me because I deny that each unjust outcome is an instance of procedural 
injustice. The passage makes me wonder why she takes such an interest in procedural justice. I can 
imagine two answers. She might be a prospectivist debater, someone who believes that the 
prospectivist gives the only reasonable reading of normative language. On this view, our perspective 
(and/or our evidence) wholly determines what we ‘ought’ to do. Anyone who thinks that facts 
about guilt or innocence, on this view, subscribe to a mistaken picture of what we ought to do, what 
is right to do, what is just, and so on. She might instead be a divider who thinks that we should focus 
on some non-objectivist reading of normative language. If so, she thinks that while there might be 
a sense in which we ‘ought’ not punish the innocent or ‘ought’ to conform to some factive standard, 
this isn’t the reading that we’re concerned with. For some reason, she thinks that the debate has to 
be about the prospective reading of ‘ought’, one that’s concerned with the agent’s perspective and 
evidence. This is more closely related to procedure.13  
While I reject the prospectivist debater’s view, I can respect the desire to give an account 
of what we prospectively ought to do, so I shall offer an account. One way to state a theory of what 
we prospectively ought to do is to first state a theory of what we objectively ought to do and then 
derive the theory of prospective obligation from that.14 Known Guilt, to my mind, provides the 
best theory of what we ought objectively to do. It tells us that we should never convict the innocent 
but convict when we’re in a position to know that someone is guilty and so identifies an ideal that 
I think better fits with our normative convictions than the implicit account of objective ideals built 
into the veritist’s decision-matrix. If we face the difficult choice of having to convict or not, we can 
expect that we’ll be uncertain whether by convicting we will deviate from the ideal by failing to 
convict when we can know that the defendant is guilty or by convicting when we aren’t in a position 
to know that the defendant was guilty. Known Guilt tells us what to do in such situations. It tells 
us to never convict the innocent and to convict whenever we can know someone to be guilty, but 
for familiar reasons people find this kind of advice unsatisfying and want an account of what we 
should do in the face of uncertainty.  
Luckily, I don’t need to invent this theory from scratch. I can appropriate the standard 
story, draw on Known Guilt to give an account of the objective ideal, and the result will be an 
account of what we prospectively ought to do and believe that captures what was good about 
Probable Guilt (i.e., it fits with our best account of the management of risk) and Normal Guilt (i.e., 
																																																						
ultimately have to deny that defendants have this right (or sever the connection between meeting 
the standard of proof and securing a just conviction).   
12 One notable exception would be Zimmerman (2009). He embraces the idea that, roughly, an 
agent’s evidence wholly determines what they might permissibly do and what her obligations might 
be and so denies that we have rights against others that they don’t harm us or don’t wrongly 
convict us for crimes we didn’t commit on the grounds that such rights would imply the existence 
of duties that wouldn’t supervene upon the agent’s evidence. I don’t believe Gardiner or Smith 
embraces this view that, as it were, my rights against you end around where your nose begins.   
13 See Sepielli (2018) for discussion.  
14 We might see Probable Guilt as such a theory. Here is why I prefer Probable Knowledge to 
Probable Truth. Probable Knowledge explains intuitions that Probable Guilt cannot. It fits with a 
better theory of what’s objectively suitable (i.e., Known Guilt as opposed to some truth-centred 
alternative). It incorporates the same approach to the management of risk, though it tells us to be 
concerned with different risks than a truth-centred approach would.   
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it explains important distinctions that Probable Guilt cannot). When we face twin normative 
pressures to promote the goods and avoid promoting the bads, we know that we ought 
prospectively to do—maximise expected choiceworthiness. We are under twin normative pressures 
because of reasons, not values.15 Fortunately, we can deal with reasons and uncertainty about them in 
a similar way.16 We can consequentialise.17 We can capture the normative content of a theory like 
Known Guilt by representing the responses that go against the (objective) reasons as if such 
responses bring about bad outcomes. This will give us a way to rank options. It will also tell us how 
much normatively worse some deviations from an ideal are from others (e.g., whether it is worse 
to fail to punish those we objectively ought to than it is to punish those we objectively ought not 
to and how much worse one thing is than the other). Here, we can use probabilistic discounting to 
determine how expectably bad an option is. What we prospectively ought to do is minimise this 
expected normative wrongfulness.   
Suppose, for example, that it is normatively bad not to convict those we were in a position 
to know were guilty and normatively worse to convict those who we weren’t in a position to know 
to be guilty. Then, we might represent the jury’s decision problem using this matrix:  
 
The Gnostic’s Decision-Matrix 
 Can know g (Kg) Cannot know g (~Kg) 
Convict 0 -3 
Don’t Convict -1 0 
 
These numbers represent how bad it is to act against the objective reasons posited by Known Guilt. 
Given this and the agent’s rational credences, we can determine when we ought prospectively to 
convict. We ought prospectively to do so iff the expected objective wrongdoing of Don’t Convict 
exceeds that of Convict. This happens when it is sufficiently probable that we know the defendant 
to be guilty. 
																																																						
15	Readers might wonder why we would need the theory of what we objectively ought to do or 
believe in addition to this theory of what we prospectively ought to do or believe. The best 
prospectivist views of obligation seem to be ones that deny that we have rights against others that 
they don’t impose harms upon us, wrongfully convict us, and so on. If what we ought prospectively 
to do is determined entirely by our evidence and not the evidence of our potential victims, it’s hard 
to see how they could have the right not to be harmed by us since such rights would have no bearing 
on what we ought prospectively to do. And if they have no such bearing, it seems empty to say that 
we nevertheless have a duty, say, not to harm them or wrongfully convict them. But, if we want to 
say that they have such rights and that we have such duties (e.g., in explaining something about 
duties of reparation, their rights to self-defence, etc.), we might find that it’s helpful to have a theory 
on which we objectively shouldn’t convict the innocent, say, or shouldn’t objectively harm others 
without overriding reason to do so. It would be hard to explain why, say, in the wake of wrongful 
conviction we have a reparative duty to the person wrongfully convicted if all we can say was that 
it was bad, unfortunate, or unlucky for them to have been convicted by someone who ought to 
convict them. I think it’s useful, in other words, to say that procedural justice is but one part of the 
just conviction. The just conviction has an objective dimension, too.  
16 This follows the recipe that Lazar (forthcoming) provides for giving a decision-theory for non-
consequentialism, a theory that he thinks provides a good theory of what we prospectively or 
subjectively ought to do. For a similar but slightly different approach, see Olsen (2018). I explore 
this further for the case of belief in Littlejohn (forthcoming b) and in Dutant and Littlejohn 
(forthcoming b). 
17 See Oddie and Milne (1991) for an explanation as to why we ought to be confident that we can 
consequentialise and an argument that we ought to use probabilistic discounting to give a theory 
of what we prospectively ought to do. 
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We can give a parallel treatment of belief:  
 
 The Gnostic’s Belief-Matrix 
 Can know g (Kg) Cannot know g (~Kg) 
Believe 0 -3 
Don’t Believe -1 0 
 
This tells us that we ought to believe a defendant to be guilty if the expected objective wrongdoing 
of Don’t Believe exceeds that of Believe, which it does when the probability that our belief will 
constitute knowledge is sufficiently high.18 
That gives us this general account of when we prospectively ought to convict and believe:  
Probable Knowledge: A jury ought to believe the defendant 
to be guilty and convict iff the probability that the jury can 
know the defendant to be guilty is sufficiently high.  
This account tells us why we shouldn’t believe or convict in Prisoners (i.e., because it is certain that 
we will violate Known Guilt), why we should in Preface Prisoners (i.e., because it is sufficiently 
probable that we know and thus the right way of dealing with the risk of violating one half of it is 
to take the chance of violating the other), and it captures the important dimension of risk-
management that seemed to be missing from Normal Guilt.  
 Like Probable Guilt and Normal Guilt, Probable Knowledge tells us that we ought 
prospectively to treat each defendant the same in Preface Prisoners and Prisoners. But unlike these 
views, it does this whilst explaining why we ought to convict the defendants in Preface Prisoners 
but not in Prisoners. (It is highly probable that we know in each case in Preface Prisoners but 
certain we don’t know in Prisoners.)  
 Smith (forthcoming) will presumably object that Probable Knowledge suffers from the very 
problem that he thinks arises for Probable Guilt, which is that it implies that we sometimes ought 
to knowingly convict the innocent:  
The evidence against each of these individuals is exactly the 
same … Having convicted … on the strength of this evidence, 
we are effectively committed to convicting each of these 
individuals as well. To convict some, and not others, would be 
deeply unjust. By convicting all 100 individuals, however, we 
are now guaranteed to have convicted an innocent—we have 
more convictions than we do crimes. To convict all 100 
individuals is tantamount to deliberately convicting an 
innocent person (forthcoming: 4). 
Smith thinks that if we were to convict each of the defendants in Prisoners knowing that one must 
be innocent, this is morally equivalent to knowingly convicting a particular innocent person in 
order to bring about some desirable outcome (e.g., by fabricating evidence and convicting 
someone known to be innocent in order to restore order and calm a frightened community). And 
if that objection works against Probable Guilt’s treatment of Prisoners, it should work equally well 
against Probable Knowledge’s treatment of Preface Prisoners.  
 Let’s flesh out Smith’s argument:  
																																																						
18 Dutant and Fitelson (MS) defend this view of rational belief by appeal to a gnostic epistemic 
utility theory (i.e., one that takes knowledge and failed attempts at knowing to be the fundamental 
goods and bads). Littlejohn (forthcoming b) defends it as a theory of rational belief by 
consequentialising a non-consequentialist knowledge-centred view of what we objectively ought 
to believe and applying probabilistic discounting on the reasons to conform to knowledge norms 
to arrive at this view.  
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P1. It is wrong to knowingly convict a single innocent person 
in order to bring about some desirable result. 
P2. If so, it would be wrong to knowingly convict a collection 
of suspects when it is known that this group contains an 
innocent person.  
C1. So, it is wrong to convict a collection of suspects when it 
is known that this group contains an innocent person. 
P3. Probable Knowledge and Probable Guilt imply that it is 
sometimes permissible to convict a collection of suspects 
known to contain an innocent person.  
C2. Thus, Probable Knowledge and Probable Guilt are 
mistaken. 
What should we make of this argument? 
If this argument were sound, it would support this principle:  
Capped Convictions: It is never permissible to knowingly 
punish N people for N-1 offenses (Littlejohn forthcoming: 
13). 
It might seem that it’s a virtue of Normal Guilt that it’s compatible with this principle and a vice 
of Probable Guilt and Probable Knowledge that it’s not.19 I have mixed feelings about appeals to 
Capped Convictions in a setting in which it is agreed that this is false:  
Never the Innocent: It isn’t permissible to punish people for 
crimes they didn’t commit. 
Smith seems to be saying that it is permissible to convict and punish the innocent, provided that 
a certain epistemic condition isn’t met. As a claim about what is objectively permitted, this seems 
wrong to me. As a claim about what is prospectively permitted, it seems quite right, but then I 
don’t think that Capped Convictions is true on this prospective reading. I think it’s true only on 
the objective reading.  
To see whether Smith’s objection to Probable Knowledge is sound in a setting where it’s 
clear that we’re talking about what we prospectively ought to do, we need to work out what we 
should think about rights and risks. I think Smith and I can agree that this is false: 
No Risk: It is never permissible to run the risk of convicting 
an innocent person. 
Normal Guilt implies that it is false because it implies that we can convict when we have normic 
support for our beliefs regardless of whether the defendant is innocent or guilty. Probable 
Knowledge likewise allows that it can be that we ought prospectively to punish the innocent.  The 
problem that he faces is that the only way that he can deny No Risk and insist on Capped 
Convictions is if he rejects this principle:  
Minimising Risk: When faced with two options both of 
which run the risk of convicting an innocent person, we can 
permissibly choose the option that minimises the expected 
objective wrongdoing associated with the violation of rights. 
But Prison Transfer made Minimising Risk seem attractive in the cases like Preface Prisoners 
and Prison Transfer.  Once we deny No Risk, the argument from Minimising Risk to the denial 
of Capped Convictions is straightforward. So, the best package of views available to someone 
																																																						
19 Smith can argue for Capped Convictions as follows. Assume Weak Justification and Normality. 
According to Weak Justification, we can only convict a collection of individuals if we justifiably 
believe of each individual that this individual is guilty. But Normality does not allow that we can 
simultaneously be justified in thinking each individual to be guilty if we also justifiably believe that 
at least one of them is innocent.   
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who denies No Risk and denies Never the Innocent is a view that incorporates Minimising Risk 
and denies Capped Convictions.  
 I’ve explained why I’m not moved by Smith’s objection, but I need to find a premise 
to deny. Since I agree with (P1), I deny (P2). Some of the best reasons I can think of for 
accepting (P1) don’t give us any reason to think that we cannot permissibly convict each of the 
defendants in Preface Prisoners. If we accept the Kantian injunction against treating a person 
merely as a means or we accept some restriction that forbids intentionally doing bad things to 
a person in order to bring about some desirable outcome, we would have our justification for 
(P1), but neither the Kantian principles nor the doctrine of double effect tells us anything about 
what we ought to do in Preface Prisoners.20 When we punish a group that we are certain 
contains an innocent person but we don’t know which person this is, we neither treat this 
person merely as a means to some end nor do we intentionally violate this person’s rights.  
 Part of what I find objectionable about Normal Guilt is this. Once we reject No Risk, 
if were to insist that we can never punish a collection of individuals known or justifiably 
believed to contain an innocent person, we end up denying Minimising Risk because of what 
appears to be a strange preference to not run risks when we have certain binary attitudes (i.e., 
knowledge, justified belief) about violating the rights of unidentified people as opposed to 
avoiding imposing greater risks upon greater numbers of people. Smith might say that I’m 
equally committed to strange views of my own, such as the idea that it’s okay to knowingly 
convict the innocent provided that their identity is hidden and not okay to do so when their 
identity is known.  
This is a tricky issue, but in cases like Prisoners and Preface Prisoners, we’re thinking 
about convicting individuals and collections of convictions. The underlying objective theory 
that serves as the foundation for what we should prospectively do was formulated in such a 
way as to make it clear that the primary locus of concern is with how we treat the individuals. 
Everything we want to say about the collections follows on from what we’ve said about the 
individuals and how we act in light of their rights and interests. The collections don’t have 
rights and interests to consider in addition to the ones that the individuals have.  Objectively 
speaking, we should convict an individual when we know them to be guilty and shouldn’t 
otherwise.  When we’re uncertain about whether the relevant objective condition obtains, the 
way that we prospectively ought to treat this individual is by trying to approximate the objective 
ideal while being mindful of the way ways that we can fall short of it (i.e., by failing to convict 
when we objectively should or by convicting when we objectively shouldn’t). And given the 
standard story about risk minimisation, this gives us Probable Knowledge. It matters that no 
particular person can reasonably object for failing to do what we prospectively ought if we 
approximate the ideal in the way that Probable Knowledge recommends. They can complain 
that their rights are violated and that we’ve failed to do what we objectively ought, but that’s a 
different matter and that kind of complaint can be levelled against Normal Guilt, too. My 
framework tells us how to register the force of this complaint. We have to concede that we did 
everything we prospectively ought to do but failed to do what we objectively ought. Reparation 
is owed.   
 
Conclusion 
Let’s return to Smith’s question. When does evidence suffice for conviction? In a sense, never. 
If the guilt or innocence of the defendant doesn’t supervene upon the jury’s evidence, the jury’s 
evidence doesn’t determine what objectively ought to be done or believed. Whether the jury 
objectively ought to convict depends upon what they can know. In another sense, the evidence 
suffices for convicting in ways we prospectively ought to when it is sufficiently probable that 
we know the defendant to be guilty. This view, Probable Knowledge, better captures our 
																																																						
20 See Aboodi, Borer, and Enoch (2008). 
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intuitions about what objectively matters, how we ought to deal with our cases, and fits with 
our best approach to risk and uncertainty.     
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